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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ARVILLE
FIELD,

KENNETH

BU1TER-

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Ut,ah
State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

Case No.
12849

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Arville Kenneth Butterlield, appeals
from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court, denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On December 21, 1971, Arville Kenneth Butterlield
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
alleging that his commitment to the Utah State Prison
was invalid. The matter was heard on February 24, 1972,
before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, who denied the
writ on February 24, 1972.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the denial of
the writ made by Judge Jeppson.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Arville Kenneth Butterfield was tried and convicted
by a jury of the crime of incest. He was represented at
trial by his retained attorney, Dwight L. King (R. 33, 34).
At the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, Mr. Butterfield and Mr. King were the only witnesses called (R. 33, 40) . Their testimonies were in substantial disagreement.
Mr. Butterfield testified that he told Mr. King that
on the night of the alleged act he (Mr. Butterfield) was
with some people, and that Mr. King had been infonned
of the names of those persons (R. 35). Petitioner further
stated that he told Mr. King that he was with one Robert
Allen at Utah Trade Technical College on the night of
the alleged crime, and that they joined a person named
Wayne or Dwayne at the Oriental Cafe and stayed there
until 2: 00 a.m. (R. 39). Mr. Butterfield could not recall
the date the crime allegedly occurred (R. 36).
Mr. King testified that no date was ever established
as the date of the occurrence of the alleged incest (R. 41),
but that August 15, 1970, was the date specified in the
information charging Mr. Butterfield (R. 42). Mr. King
believed it to be in the best interest of his client not to
establish an exact date of the crime, thereby raising doubt

'
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in the minds of the jury (R. 45). He also believed that
unless an exact date were established, the defense of
alibi would not be useful, reasoning that it would not
make any difference where petitioner was on a particular
day if the exact day that the incest occurred were not
known (R. 41, 42). Mr. Butterfield accepted this advice
(R 46). Mr. King testified that he had discussed possible
alibi w,it11.esses with Mr. Butterfield, but that the only
witnesses discussed were persons allegedly having relations v.rl-'.:h the Butterfield daughters rather than friends
of the petitioner who could vouch for his whereabouts
on the night in question (R. 40, 41, 43, 44). Mr. King
rec:.:illed no names of possible alibi witnesses and no such
names appeared in his notes (R. 41, 44). Mr. King did
not think it possible to establish an alibi under the circumstances, and thus did not investigate any alibi witnesses (R. 43).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT
A PROPER REMEDY UNDER THE FACTS
OF THIS CASE.
Appellant alleges one ground in his brief for which
he seeks review. It is that Dwight L. King, his retained
attorney, inadequately defended him. This issue was
l:nown to the petitioner at the time of his commitment
to the Utah State Prison, yet no appeal from his com-
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mitment was made. According to Utah law, the proper
procedure should have been to appeal his sentence.
Appellant is trying to use the writ of habeas corpus
as a means of appellate review. This is not the purpose '
for which the writ was established. See Bryant v. Turner,
19 U. 2d 284, 431 P. 2d 121 (1967), wherein it is stated:
"The writ is, as our rules describe it, an extraordinary writ, to be used to protect one who is
restrained of his liberty where there exists no jurisdiction or authority, or where the requirements
of the law have been so ignored or distorted that
the party is substantially and effectively denied
what is included in the term due process of law,
or where some other such circumstance exist.s that
it would be wholly unconscionable not to re-ex·
amine the conviction." Id. at 286-287, 122-123.

1

When the same facts alleged in a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus are known to the petitioner at the time
of his judgment, his proper remedy is not a writ. In
Brown v. Turner, 21 U. 2d 96, 440 P. 2d 968 (1968), the
petitioner contended that he was denied the right to
counsel, and that he did not understand the consequences ,
of his guilty plea. The Supreme Court of Utah held that
the petitioner was not entitled to the habeas corpus
remedy:
1

"If the contention of error is something which
is known or should be known to the party at the
time the judgment was entered, it must be re·
viewed in the manner and within the time per·
mitted by regular proscribed procedure, or the
judgment becomes final and is not subject fur·
ther attack, except in some such unusual crrcurn·

5
stance as we have mentioned above. Were it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure governing appeals and limitations of time specified therein
would be rendered impotent." Id. at 98-99, 969.
In Jaramillo v. Turner, 24 U. 2d 19, 465 P. 2d 343
(1970) , the petitioner charged with the crime of robbery
withdrew hls plea of not guilty, plead guilty and did not
appeal from the judgment and sentence. Instead, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that at the time
of his change of plea, he was not advised of the consequences of his plea of guilty, and that his counsel inadequately defended him. The Utah Supreme Court held
that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a
means of appellate review, and affirmed denial of the writ.

In the recent case of Zumbrunnen v. Turner, Case
No. 12754 (May 17, 1972), the defendant plead guilty to
burglary upon dismissal of two similar charges. He petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after his time for appeal
from the conviction had expired claiming (1) his plea
was involuntary and unintelligent and (2) his counsel
was incompetent. This Court held that both points could
have been argued on a regular appeal, and that the writ
of habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for such
appeal.
For the above reasons, the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in thls case is an improper remedy, and the
decision below should be affirmed.
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POINT II.
THE PETITIONER RECEIVED ADEQUATE
ASSISTANCE OF COMPETENT COUNSEL.
The right to effective or adequate assistance of counsel was first enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 72 L. Ed. 158,
53 S. Ct. 55 (1932), which held that failure to make an
effective appointment of counsel violates the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and is a denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Utah adopted this view in State v. Hines, 6 U. 2d
126, 307 P. 2d 887 (1957), holding that the privilege of
an accused to the assistance of counsel is one of the fun·
damental rights, meaning the assistance of a reputable
member of the bar who is willing and in a position to
honestly and conscientiously represent the interests of
the defendant. In Alires v. Turner, 22 U. 2d 118, 449 P.
2d 241 (1969), the Court held that a failure to be provided effective assistance of counsel results in a denial
of due process. See Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the
Utah Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has left to the
state and lower courts the task of setting standards of
trial attorney effectiveness. If the standard be too strict,
the defendant could be denied due process, but if too
liberal, there is the threat of a stampede of prisoners
claiming that their attorneys were not effective merely
because they were not acquitted.
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California's st:mdard of legal competency requires
the; petitioner to show that the trial was reduced to a
farce or sham through the attorney's lack of competence,
diligence or knowledge of the law. See In re Beaty, 64
Cal. 2d 760, 414 P. 2d 817, 51 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1966).
In Arizona, the Court allows a contention of deprivation of right to counsel to be asserted in habeas corpus
proceedings only in extreme cases. If a petitioner sets
forth no facts which indicate that the attorney's performance was so substandard as to render the trial a farce or
sham, the petition is properly denied. See Barron v. State,
7 Ariz. App. 223, 437 P. 2d 975 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968).
Kansas has adopted an extremely strict standard. In
McGee v. Crouse, 190 Kan. 615, 376 P. 2d 792 (1962),
the Court said:
"
. the burden is cast upon the petitioner
to show that his counsel was so incompetent and
inadequate in representing him that the total
effect was that of a complete absence of counsel."
Id. at 618, 795.
The Utah standard is slightly different. In Bryant
v. Turner, supra, this Court said that a habeas corpus
remedy is allowed only if the circumstances indicate that
it would be wholly unconscionable not to re-examine the
petitioner's conviction. The method the Utah Court uses
in deciding this issue is to examine the record. In Washington v. Turner, 17 U. 2d 361, 412 P. 2d 449 (1966), the
Court looked to the record for suggestions of "bad faith
conduct" on the part of the attorney. This concept of
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"bad faith" was defined in Alires v. Turner, supra, as
follows:
"The [due process] requirement [of counsel]
is not satisfied by a sham or pretense of an appearance in the record by an attorney who manifests no real concern about the interests of the
accused." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 121,
The above stated standard should be relied upon in
examining the actions of Dwight L. King to deterntlne
whether such actions amounted to a sham, a pretense or
a bad faith display of a lack of concern for his client. A
preliminary fact question must be resolved first. Mr.
King testified that he did not investigate any alibi wit·
nesses because no specific date of the occurrence of the
alleged incest was established. He further testified that
the only alibi witnesses mentioned by Mr. Butterfield had
nothing to do with proving (Mr. Butterfield's) where·
abouts when the alleged incest occurred. If these facts
are accepted, the inadequacy of counsel question should
not even be raised since there would be no alibi witnesses
for Mr. King to investigate.
However, Mr. Butterfield insists that he discussed
with Mr. King certain named alibi witnesses who could
prove his whereabouts, and that Mr. King's failure to in·
vestigate those witnesses is prima facie evidence of in·
adequate counsel. If these facts be assumed true, the
aforementioned standard may be applied to detennine
whether failure to investigate alleged alibi witnesses
amounts to a showing of inadequate counsel.
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In Thomas v. Rhay, 2 Wash. App. 843, 472 P. 2d 606
(1970) , the petitioner alleged incompetency of counsel
for failure to call certain witnesses and the Court of Appeals of Washington held:
"Mistakes or errors of judgment on the part
of counsel and his client do not establish the violation of constitutional rights. The mere failure
to call certain witnesses who appellant now claims
would have established an alibi constitutes an exercise of trial judgment on the part of counsel
and presents no constitutional issue." Id. at 844,
607.

Landers v. State, ex rel. Eyman, 7 Ariz. App. 197, 437
P. 2d 681 (1968), also held that defense counsel's not
producing witnesses in his client's behalf at the preliminary hearing constitutes no more than error of judgment
and does not entitle the prisoner to habeas corpus relief
on the theory of denial of effective assistance of counsel.
It should be noted that every case cited by appellant
wherein the attorney's actions were held to be a sham,
farce, pretense, etc., the failure to call certain witnesses
was but one in a series of courtroom abuses and errors
made by the defense attorney; however, in the present
case, the failure to investigate witnesses is the only issue.
The state contends that unless this one factor be part of
a series of errors, the attorney should not be deemed incompetent. In Hayes v. Hudspeth, 169 Kan. 248, 217 P.
2d 904 (1950), cert. den., 340 U. S. 835, 95 L. Ed. 613, 71
S. Ct. 17 ( 1950) , the court held as follows:
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"A statement by petitioner that his counsel
in the criminal case in which he was convicted
failed to subpoena certain witnesses in petitioner's
behalf does not in itself constitute proof of nrofessional incompetency or justify the
of
a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 255, 905.
0

Alco, in People v. Hartridge, 134 C. A. 2d 659, 286
P. 2d 72 (1955), the California Third District Court of
Appeals went further and described a series of errors that
still would not constitute incompetent representation on
the part of the attorney:

"Allegations of mistakes on the part of trial
counsel such as that he failed to have a def.sndant
testify or offer testimony on his own behalf, or
that he failed to obtain available evidence or to
ask for a continuance are not recognized as grounds
for habeas corpus. . . . " (Emphasis added.) Id.
at 667, 77.
Inasmuch as the record is devoid of any suggestion
of bad faith, the calculated decision not to investigate
alibi witnesses did not reduce the trial to a "sham or pre·
tense" and the appellant's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was properly denied.
Respondent also contends that the fact petitioner re·
tained his own counsel ought to be fatal to his claim.
Courts have often attached some significance to whether
the attorney was privately retained or court-appointed in
determining whether relief should be gra1.1ted. In Snead
v. Smyth, 271 F. 2d 838 (4th Cir. 1959), the court said:
"It has been repeatedly held that in case of
counsel selected by the defendant the commission
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of what retroactively may appear to be errors of
judgment on the part of the attorney does not
constitute a constitutional lack of due process.... "
Id. at 842.
In Popeko v. United States, 294 F. 2d 168 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. den., 374 U. S. 835, 10 L. Ed. 1056, 83 S. Ct.
1883 (1963), the privately retained trial attorney failed
to call defendant's witnesses and the court said:
" ... we think it basic to the claim of relief, since
defendants were represented by their own employed trial counsel, that they may not assign as
error that the mistakes or errors of their counsel
constituted an unfair trial. ..." Id, at 171.
Some courts further argue that under an agency relationship the acts of the attorney are imputed to the
client who has retained him. See State v. Montez, 102
Ariz. 444, 432 P. 2d 456, 459 (1967).
Respondent contends that on review of a habeas
corpus proceeding, the Court should take cognizance of
the presumption that the prisoner's rights were safeguarded by the trial court, and that the defense counsel
faithfully performed his duty to protect the defendant's
rights. See Busby v. Holman, 356 F. 2d 75 (5th Cir.
1966). It then becomes incumbent upon the petitioner to
prove his right to relief by showing the incompetency of
his counsel. Such a burden is a heavy one and relief is
granted only in extreme cases where counsel has been
so grossly ineffective as to constitute no representation at all, or farce, sham, pretense, etc. Respondent contends that this burden of proof has not been met
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by appellant, and that Dwight L. King's decision not to
investigate alibi witnesses was made in good faith with
the best interest of his client in mind, and upon rational
consideration of critical facts as they appeared at the
time.
This Court warned in Jaramillo v. Turner, supra:
". . . in order to prevent further erosion of
the meaning of the Constitution of the United
States and to revive the memory of what was originally intended by the Sixth Amendment thereto,
we wish to address a few remarks to the new claim
of inadequate representation by his lawyer.
"To begin with, this is usually but a loophole
through which guilty men hope to escape from the
debts which they owe to society for past criminal
behavior. It is a loophole through which other
guilty men have escaped from their just desserls
under the law, and it is a loophole through which
guilty men will be released to prey upon law-abiding citizens unless courts look more carefully at
the requirements of the Constitution as set forth
therein." Id. at 21, 344.
CONCLUSION
Respondent contends that based upon the foregoing
reasons, appellant should not be permitted to use habeas
corpus proceedings as a substitute for appellate review,
that appellant was represented by competent, adequat.e,
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and effective counsel, and that the denial of appellant's
petition for a writ of habeas corpus ought to be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
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Chief Assistant Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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